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Abstract
We investigate the fundamental limit of quantum-secure covert communication over the lossy
thermal noise bosonic channel, the quantum-mechanical model underlying many practical channels.
We assume that the adversary has unlimited quantum information processing capabilities as well as
access to all transmitted photons that do not reach the legitimate receiver. Given existence of noise
that is uncontrolled by the adversary, the square root law (SRL) governs covert communication: up to
c
√
n covert bits can be transmitted reliably in n channel uses. Attempting to surpass this limit results
in detection with unity probability as n → ∞. Here we present the expression for c, characterizing
the SRL for the bosonic channel. We also prove that discrete-valued coherent state quadrature phase
shift keying (QPSK) constellation achieves the optimal c, which is the same as that achieved by a
circularly-symmetric complex-valued Gaussian prior on coherent state amplitude. Finally, while binary
phase shift keying (BPSK) achieves the Holevo capacity for non-covert bosonic channels in the low
received signal-to-noise ratio regime, we show that it is strictly sub-optimal for covert communication.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Covert, or low probability of detection/intercept (LPD/LPI), communication prevents trans-
mission’s detection by an adversary. This is a stricter security requirement than protection
of transmission’s content from unauthorized access provided by the standard methods, e.g.,
encryption and quantum key distribution (QKD). While covert communication has many practical
applications, its fundamental limits were underexplored until [1], [2] proved that square root law
(SRL) governs covert communication over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel: no
more than c
√
n covert bits can be transmitted with arbitrarily small decoding error probability to
the intended receiver in n uses of the channel, where c is a constant and n = TW is the product
of the transmission duration T (in seconds) and the bandwidth W (in Hz) of the source around its
center frequency. Attempting to transmit more results in either detection by the adversary with
high probability as n → ∞, or unreliable transmission. Even though the capacity of the covert
channel is zero (since limn→∞ c
√
n
n = 0), as n increases, SRL allows transmission of a significant
number of covert bits for large n. Subsequent work extended [1], [2] by characterizing c [3],
[4], showing the SRL for discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) [3]–[5], and determining it up
to the second order [6]. A tutorial explanation of the SRL and its implications is offered in
[7]. Consider an optical channel with additive thermal noise. The use of laser light modulation
at the transmitter and coherent detection (homodyne or heterodyne) at the receiver induces an
AWGN channel, with covert communication governed by the SRL in [1], [2]. Fundamentally,
however, electromagnetic waves are quantum mechanical: they are boson fields. Currently, noises
of quantum-mechanical origin limit the performance of advanced high-sensitivity photodetection
systems [8]–[10]. Therefore, analysis of the ultimate limits of any communications system
requires quantum information theory [11]. This led to the development of the SRL for covert
communication over the lossy thermal noise bosonic channel, which is the underlying quantum-
mechanical description of many practical channels, including optical, microwave, and radio-
frequency (RF) [12]. The single-mode bosonic channel, depicted in Fig. 1 and formally defined
Fig. 1. Single-mode bosonic channel E n¯Bη modeled by a beamsplitter with transmissivity η and an environment injecting a
thermal state ρˆn¯B with mean photon number n¯B. aˆ, eˆ, bˆ, and wˆ label input/output modal annihilation operators.
in Section II-A, is parametrized by the power coupling (transmissivity) η between the transmitter
Alice and the intended receiver Bob, and the mean photon number n¯B per mode injected by the
environment, where a single spatial-temporal-polarization mode is our fundamental transmission
unit. In our analysis (as in [12]) we do not assume a specific receiver structure for the adversary
Willie. Willie has access to all transmitted photons that are not captured by Bob, on which he can
perform arbitrary quantum information processing, including joint detection measurement, and
use of unlimited quantum memory and computing resources. This makes our system quantum-
secure. Furthermore, we assume that Willie has knowledge of all communication system details
(including the start time, center frequency, duration, and bandwidth of the transmission), except
for a secret shared between Alice and Bob before communication begins. We use this secret to
enable covertness irrespective of channel conditions1 and note that this meets the “best practices”
of secure system design as the security of the system only depends on the shared secret [13].
Finally, we assume existence of noise that is not under Willie’s control. Not only is this well-
grounded, but also is necessary for covertness, as otherwise, transmissions cannot be hidden
[12, Th. 1]. We use standard asymptotic notation [14, Ch. 3.1], where f (n) = O(g(n)) and
1While this assumption seems onerous, in many scenarios the cost of having transmission detected greatly exceeds that of
sharing a secret. Furthermore, classical results [3], [5] suggest that the secret is unnecessary if Alice has a better channel to
Bob than to Willie, however, ensuring this in practice may be harder than exchanging a secret.
f (n) = o(h(n)) denote g(n) and h(n) as asymptotically tight and loose upper bounds on f (n),
respectively. The SRL implies that the number M of reliably transmissible covert bits using n
modes is:
M =
√
nδccovcrel + o(
√
n), (1)
where δ parametrizes the desired level of covertness (formally defined in Section II-B), ccov
characterizes the mean transmitted photon number per mode n¯S = δccov/√n that is covert given
both the channel and the modulation scheme, while crel captures the amount of information that
can be transmitted reliably (i.e., with arbitrarily small decoding error probability) by encoding
it in n¯S photons/mode. Our main focus is ccov, which determines the number of covertly-
transmissible photons. We show that the optimal ccov is:
ccov =
√
2ηn¯B(1 + ηn¯B)
1 − η , (2)
and note that ccov does not depend on Bob’s receiver. We then prove that it is achievable using
quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) modulation over coherent states (which describe ideal
laser light quantum-mechanically). Since binary phase shift keying (BPSK) is known to achieve
the Holevo capacity of (non-covert) communication over lossy thermal noise bosonic channel in
the low received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime [15], we evaluate its covertness properties.
We find that it is strictly suboptimal to QPSK, which further underscores the differences between
covert and non-covert communications. However, the optimality of QPSK modulation leads to
exact characterization of the optimal coding strategy and crel. We show how QPSK is combined
with any channel code while maintaining covertness and describe how optimal crel is achieved
in expectation. We also discuss a promising approach to solving the general coding problem for
covert communications over bosonic channels, leaving the full treatment to future work. The
work presented in this paper allows construction of communications systems for many practical
channels (including optical, microwave, RF, and others) that are provably covert against the
most powerful adversaries allowed by the laws of physics. As such, these systems are future-
proof. Our results also have far-reaching implications beyond covert communication. At the heart
of our proof lies a new result on quantum state discrimination of a discrete set of displaced
thermal states, which would lead to fundamental insights into optical state discrimination in loss
and noise. This has applications to optical communications and sensing, as well as structured
designs for optimal receivers for these tasks—a topic wide open for future research. This paper
is organized as follows: next we present formally the lossy thermal noise bosonic channel model
and the mathematical criteria for covertness. In Section III we prove the converse by showing
that our covertness criterion does not allow ccov to exceed the right hand side (RHS) of (2). In
Section IV we investigate discrete coherent state constellations, focusing on QPSK and BPSK,
and show that QPSK achieves the RHS of (2) while BPSK does not. In Section V we discuss
the characterization of crel and the coding strategies for covert communication.
II. PREREQUISITES
A. Channel model
Consider a single mode lossy thermal noise channel E n¯Bη in Fig. 1. This is the quantum
mechanical description of the transmission of a single (spatio-temporal-polarization) mode of
the electromagnetic field at a given transmission wavelength (such as optical or microwave) over
linear loss and additive Gaussian noise (such as noise stemming from blackbody radiation). A
beamsplitter with transmissivity (fractional power coupling) η models loss. The input-output
relationship between the bosonic mode operators of the single-mode Alice-to-Bob channel, bˆ =
√
ηaˆ +
√
1 − ηeˆ, requires the “environment” mode eˆ to ensure [bˆ, bˆ†] = 1, and preserve the
Heisenberg uncertainty law of quantum mechanics. Contrarily, power attenuation in a classical
channel is captured by the relationship b =
√
ηa, where a and b are complex amplitudes of
input and output mode functions. Bob captures a fraction η of Alice’s transmitted photons,
while Willie is assumed to have access to the remaining 1 − η fraction. Noise is modeled by
mode eˆ being in a zero-mean thermal state ρˆn¯B , which is expressed in the coherent state and
Fig. 2. Covert communication over lossy thermal noise bosonic channel. Alice has a lossy thermal noise bosonic channel
depicted in Fig. 1 to legitimate receiver Bob and adversary Willie. Alice encodes message x with blocklength n code, and
chooses whether to transmit it using E n¯Bη n times. Willie observes his channel from Alice to determine whether she is quiet
(null hypothesis H0) or not (alternate hypothesis H1). Covert communication system must ensure that any detector Willie uses
is close to ineffective (i.e., a random guess between the hypotheses), while allowing Bob to reliably decode the message (if one
is transmitted). Alice and Bob share a secret prior to transmission.
Fock (photon number) bases as follows:
ρˆn¯B =
1
pin¯B
∫
C
exp
[
− |α |
2
n¯B
]
d2α |α〉 〈α | =
∞∑
k=0
tk |k〉 〈k | , (3)
where
tk =
n¯kB
(1 + n¯B)k+1 (4)
and n¯B is the mean photon number per mode injected by the environment. Our covert commu-
nication framework is depicted in Fig. 2. We treat each mode as the fundamental transmission
unit and assume that n = 2TW modes are available to Alice and Bob. TW is the number of
orthogonal temporal modes, which is the product of the transmission duration T (in seconds)
and the optical bandwidth W (in Hz) of the source around its center frequency. The factor of
two corresponds to the use of both orthogonal polarizations. Alice attempts to communicate
reliably to Bob without detection by Willie as depicted. She uses a secret shared with Bob prior
to the start of communication. If she decides to transmit message x, she modulates an n-mode
state ρˆA
n
x using the shared secret. While we assume that the bosonic channel acts on each input
mode independently, ρˆA
n
x may be entangled across n modes. Alice and Bob desire reliability: for
any  > 0, Bob’s decoding error probability P(b)e ≤  for n sufficiently large. Bob may employ
joint detection (entangling) measurement across n modes. Willie performs a quantum-optimal
hypothesis test to determine whether Alice transmitted, which we discuss next.
B. Hypothesis testing and covertness criteria
As described in Fig. 2, Willie observes a product thermal state ρˆW
n
0 = ρˆ
⊗n
ηn¯B when Alice
does not transmit and some other state ρˆW
n
1 when she does. Hypothesis H0 corresponds to no
transmission, and H1 to transmission. Willie can err in raising a false alarm or missing Alice’s
transmission. We denote Willie’s probability of false alarm by PFA = P(choose H1 |H0) and his
probability of missed detection by PMD = P(choose H0 |H1). Assuming equally likely hypotheses
P(H0) = P(H1) = 12 , Willie’s detection error probability is P(w)e = PFA+PMD2 , which gives rise to
the following covertness criterion:
Criterion 1. A system is covert if, for any δP > 0, P(w)e ≥ 12 − δP for n large enough.
Subscript “P” refers to “probability of detection error” limit: since random decision results
in P(w)e = 12 , small δP ensures that any detector that Willie constructs is similarly ineffective.
Criterion 1 applies even when the hypotheses are not equally likely [16]. A quantum-optimal
receiver yields min P(w)e = 12 − 14 ‖ ρˆW
n
0 − ρˆW
n
1 ‖1, where ‖ ρˆ − σˆ‖1 is the trace distance between
quantum states ρˆ and σˆ [11, Section 9.1.4]. Thus, Criterion 1 is satisfied if 14 ‖ ρˆW
n
0 − ρˆW
n
1 ‖1 ≤ δP.
However, quantum relative entropy (QRE) D(ρˆ‖σˆ) = Tr [ρˆ log ρˆ − ρˆ log σˆ] is a more conve-
nient measure of covertness because it is additive over product states: D (ρˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2‖σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ2) =
D (ρˆ1‖σˆ1) + D (ρˆ2‖σˆ2). It is related to performance of optimal hypothesis test by the quantum
Chernoff-Stein lemma [17] and Pinsker’s inequality ‖ ρˆ − σˆ‖1 ≤
√
2D(ρˆ‖σˆ) [11, Th. 10.8.1].
Therefore, instead of Criterion 1, in the analysis that follows we use the following:
Criterion 2. A system is covert if, for any δQRE > 0, D
(
ρˆW
n
1 ‖ ρˆW
n
0
)
≤ δQRE for n large enough.
By Pinsker’s inequality, setting δQRE = 2δ2P, Alice maintains a slightly higher level of covert-
ness. Classical version of Criterion 2 has been used in covert communication proofs over standard
classical channels [3], [4]; we follow the same methodology here, setting δ =
√
δQRE in (1).
III. ULTIMATE LIMIT OF COVERT COMMUNICATION OVER BOSONIC CHANNEL
Criterion 2 imposes a constraint on Alice’s transmitted mean photon number per mode n¯S:
Theorem 1 (Converse). D
(
ρˆW
n
1 ‖ ρˆW
n
0
)
≤ δRE implies that n¯S ≤
√
2ηn¯B(1+ηn¯B)
1−η
√
δQRE
n .
Proof: Alice transmits one of 2M equally-likely M-bit messages by choosing an element
from an arbitrary codebook C = { ρˆAnx , x = 1, . . . , 2M}, where a state ρˆAnx = |ψx〉A
nAn〈ψx | encodes
an M-bit message x, and C is kept secret from Willie. |ψx〉An = ∑m∈Nn0 am(x) |m〉 is a general
n-mode pure state, where |m〉 ≡ |m1〉 ⊗ |m2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |mn〉 is a tensor product of n Fock states. The
mean photon number of an n-mode codeword ρˆA
n
x is N¯S,n(x) =
∑
m∈Nn0 (
∑n
k=1 mi)|am(x)|2. We
limit our analysis to pure input states since, by convexity, using mixed states as inputs can only
deteriorate the performance (it is equivalent to transmitting a randomly chosen pure state from
an ensemble and discarding the knowledge of that choice). When Alice transmits ρˆA
n
x , Willie
receives a mixed state ρˆW
n
x with the mean photon number (1− η)N¯S,n(x)+ ηnn¯B. Willie does not
have the codebook and must run a hypothesis test between a product thermal state ρˆW
n
0 = ρˆ
⊗n
ηn¯B
and a mixed state ρ¯W
n
1 =
1
2M
∑2M
x=1 ρˆ
Wn
x . The QRE is:
D
(
ρ¯W
n
1
ρˆ⊗nηn¯B) = −S ( ρ¯Wn1 ) − Tr [ ρ¯Wn1 log ρˆ⊗nηn¯B ] , (5)
where S(ρ) = −Tr[ρ log ρ] is the von Neumann entropy. Denote Willie’s photon number operator
associated with the k th mode by Nˆk = wˆ
†
k wˆk , where wˆk is Willie’s annihilation operator associated
with the k th mode. Since Nˆk is diagonal in Fock basis, by the properties of operator exponential,
ρˆ⊗nηn¯B =
n⊗
k=1
1
ηn¯B + 1
(
ηn¯B
ηn¯B + 1
) Nˆk
(6)
Substitution of (6) into (5) yields:
D
(
ρ¯W
n
1
ρˆ⊗nηn¯B) = −S ( ρ¯Wn1 ) − Tr [ ρ¯Wn1 log n⊗
k=1
1
ηn¯B + 1
(
ηn¯B
ηn¯B + 1
) Nˆk ]
(7)
= −S
(
ρ¯W
n
1
)
− Tr
[
ρ¯W
n
1
n∑
k=1
log
[
1
ηn¯B + 1
(
ηn¯B
ηn¯B + 1
) Nˆk ] ]
(8)
= −S
(
ρ¯W
n
1
)
− Tr
[
ρ¯W
n
1 n log
[
1
ηn¯B + 1
]
+ log
[
ηn¯B
ηn¯B + 1
] n∑
k=1
ρ¯W
n
1 Nˆk
]
(9)
= −S
(
ρ¯W
n
1
)
+ n log[ηn¯B + 1] − n[(1 − η)n¯S + ηn¯B] log
[
ηn¯B
ηn¯B + 1
]
, (10)
where (10) is because n¯S = 1n2M
∑2M
x=1 N¯S,n(x). Now, denote by ρ¯W1,k the state of the k th mode of
ρ¯W
n
1 that is obtained by tracing out the n − 1 other modes. Let n¯k be the mean photon number
of ρ¯W1,k . We upper-bound S
(
ρ¯W
n
1
)
by:
S
(
ρ¯W
n
1
) (a)≤ n∑
k=1
S
(
ρ¯W
n
1,k
) (b)≤ n∑
k=1
g(n¯k)
(c)≤ ng((1 − η)n¯S + ηn¯B), (11)
where (a) follows from the sub-additivity of the von Neumann entropy, (b) is because the
maximum von Neumann entropy of a single-mode state with mean photon number constraint n¯
is g(n¯), where g(x) = (1+ x) log2(1+ x)− x log2 x [18], and (c) follows from Jensen’s inequality.
Substituting (11) into (10), expanding g(x), and re-arranging terms yields:
D
(
ρ¯W
n
1
ρˆ⊗nηn¯B) ≥ n (((1 − η)n¯S + ηn¯B) log [1 + (1 − η)n¯Sηn¯B
]
− (1 + (1 − η)n¯S + ηn¯B) log
[
1 +
(1 − η)n¯S
1 + ηn¯B
] )
. (12)
Since x − x22 ≤ log(1 + x) ≤ x − x
2
2 +
x3
3 for x ≥ 0, we obtain:
D
(
ρ¯W
n
1
ρˆ⊗nηn¯B) ≥ n(1 − η)2n¯2S2ηn¯B(1 + ηn¯B) + o(n¯2S). (13)
Discarding low-order terms, and solving (13) for n¯S yields the proof.
The equality (2) is implied by matching upper and lower bounds on n¯S in Theorem 1 and [12,
Th. 2], respectively. However, the lower bound in [12, Th. 2] is developed from a random coding
argument which uses an isotropic complex-valued Gaussian modulation of coherent states. While
such arguments are useful in mathematical proofs, they are a poor choice in practice because
of 1) exponential complexity of random codes, 2) unbounded storage required for complex
numbers, and, 3) lack of peak power constraint. Discrete modulation of coherent states is not
only practical, but also achieves the Holevo capacity for the low received SNR [15]. Discrete
constellations also simplify coding: a polar code can be used over a discrete alphabet to achieve
the channel capacity afforded by that alphabet. Since covert communication naturally operates
in the low SNR regime, we consider the discrete modulation of coherent states next.
IV. DISCRETE MODULATION FOR COVERT COMMUNICATION OVER BOSONIC CHANNELS
A. Construction of transmitted sequence
Consider Alice transmitting an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence a of
n symbols drawn from a discrete alphabet A = {al, l = 1, . . . , L, al ∈ C} with probability p(l).
This corresponds a transmission using either:
• Secret random code: Alice and Bob secretly create a random code that maps M-bit input
blocks to n-symbol codewords from An by generating 2M codeword sequences C = {c(x)},
x = 1, . . . , 2M for messages {x} according to p(c) = ∏nk=1 p(ck) where p(ck = al) = p(l).
• Secret random sequence: Before communicating Alice and Bob secretly draw a sequence
r ∈ {1, . . . , L}n of length n where p(r) = ∏nk=1 p(rk). Message x is mapped to an n-
symbol codeword c(x) ∈ {1, . . . , L}n using a code that is known to Willie. Alice transmits
a sequence from An corresponding to a = (c(x) + r) mod L, with element-wise modulo.
Bob uses r to decode (e.g., by adding r modulo L to the received transmission before
decoding).
We consider binary and quadrature shift keying (BPSK and QPSK) modulation with correspond-
ing alphabets Ab = {a,− ja} and Aq = {a, ja,−a,− ja}. Probabilities are p(a) = p(−a) = 12 for
(a) Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) (b) Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK)
Fig. 3. Discrete coherent state constellations used by Alice’s modulator.
BPSK and p(a) = p( ja) = p(−a) = p(− ja) = 14 for QPSK. On each mode, Alice transmits
a coherent state with amplitudes corresponding to symbols from either Ab or Aq, with the
resulting constellations depicted in Fig. 3.
B. Willie’s received state
When Alice transmits |a〉, Willie receives a displaced thermal state ρˆηn¯B(
√
1 − ηa), where
ρˆn¯B(a) =
1
pin¯B
∫
C
exp
[
− |β − a|
2
n¯B
]
d2β |β〉 〈β | . (14)
However, Alice’s scheme described in Section IV-A results in Willie observing a mixture ρˆW1,L =∑L
l=1 p(l)ρˆηn¯B(
√
1 − ηal) of L displaced thermal states in each of n modes. This is because the
secret random code has no structure of use to Willie, and the secret random sequence2 destroys
any structure in the public code that could be used by Willie. Note that neither the transmitted
2This scheme resembles an application of a one-time pad that is typically used in cryptography to ensure absolute secrecy
[19]. Its use for covert communication is described in [2, Remark after Th. 1.2].
codeword from the random codebook nor the random sequence r can be re-used. Since Alice’s
modulated sequence is i.i.d., Willie observes ρˆW
n
1,L =
(
ρˆW1,L
)⊗n
. The QRE is thus:
D
(
ρˆW
n
1,L ‖ ρˆW
n
0
)
= nD
(
ρˆW1,L ‖ ρˆηn¯B
)
. (15)
Thus, to maintain Criterion 2, Alice must employ a modulation scheme such that
D
(
ρˆW1,L ‖ ρˆηn¯B
)
≤ δQRE
n
. (16)
Next we prove that QPSK constellation achieves the fundamental limit of covert communication
over the lossy thermal noise bosonic channel. This is because it allows the transmission of the
maximal mean photon number characterized by (2) while maintaining Criterion 2. Since BPSK
modulation achieves the Holevo capacity for the low received SNR regime [15], which is natural
for covert communication, we analyze the performance of BPSK. We show that it is strictly
suboptimal, and that maintaining covertness requires reducing the mean photon number over
QPSK, further underscoring the differences between covert and non-covert communications.
We conclude this section by showing how to make a constant amplitude QPSK constellation
covert, and allow the use of practical channel codes. Before we continue, we state useful lemmas.
Suppose Aˆ(t) and Bˆ(t) are non-singular operators parametrized by t, and Iˆ is the identity operator.
Then the following two lemmas hold:
Lemma 1 ( [20, Th. 6]). ddt log Aˆ(t) =
∫ 1
0 ds
[
sAˆ(t) + (1 − s)Iˆ]−1 dAˆ(t)dt [sAˆ(t) + (1 − s)Iˆ]−1.
Lemma 2 ( [20, lemma in Sec. 4]). ddtB
−1(t) = −B−1(t)dBˆ(t)dt B−1(t).
C. Quadrature phase shift keying
Theorem 2. QPSK modulation achieves n¯S ≤
√
2ηn¯B(1+ηn¯B)
1−η
√
δQRE
n while maintaining
D
(
ρˆW
n
1 ‖ ρˆW
n
0
)
= nD
(
ρˆW1,m‖ ρˆηn¯B
)
.
Proof: Consider ρˆ1,q = 14 (ρˆ00 + ρˆ01 + ρˆ10 + ρˆ11), as the equal-weighted mixture of displaced
thermal states where ρˆ00 ≡ ρˆn¯T(u), ρˆ01 ≡ ρˆn¯T( ju), ρˆ10 ≡ ρˆn¯T(−u), and ρˆ11 ≡ ρˆn¯T(− ju) with ρˆn¯T(β)
defined in (14). Subscript “q” stands for QPSK, since setting u =
√
1 − ηb and n¯T = ηn¯B yields
ρˆ00, ρˆ01, ρˆ10, and ρˆ11 as the displaced thermal states observed by Willie when Alice transmits
|b〉, | jb〉, |−b〉, and |− jb〉, respectively, and zero-mean thermal state ρˆ0 ≡ ρˆn¯T(0) when she
does not transmit. Thus, setting ρˆW1,m = ρˆ1,q and dropping W from superscript for brevity yields
D
(
ρˆ1,q‖ ρˆ0
)
as the left hand side of (16). There are no known closed form expressions for
D
(
ρˆ1,q‖ ρˆ0
)
, therefore, we evaluate its Taylor series expansion. To do so, we must find the first
four derivatives of ρˆ1,q with respect to displacement u, and set u = 0. The derivatives of ρˆ00,
ρˆ01, ρˆ10, and ρˆ11 are as follows [21, Ch. VI, Eq. (1.31)]:
dρˆ00
du
= n¯−1T
(
(aˆ − u)ρˆ00 + ρˆ00(aˆ† − u)
)
, (17)
dρˆ01
du
= −n¯−1T
(
( j aˆ + u)ρˆ01 − ρˆ01( j aˆ† − u)
)
, (18)
dρˆ10
du
= −n¯−1T
(
(aˆ + u)ρˆ10 + ρˆ10(aˆ† + u)
)
, (19)
dρˆ11
du
= n¯−1T
(
( j aˆ − u)ρˆ11 − ρˆ11( j aˆ† + u)
)
, (20)
where aˆ† and aˆ denote Alice’s creation and annihilation operators, respectively. These allow us
to differentiate ρˆ1,q with respect to displacement u. For each, setting u = 0 yields:
dρˆ1,q
du

u=0
=
d3 ρˆ1,q
du3

u=0
= 0, (21)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
=
2
n¯2T
(
aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†
)
− 2
n¯T
(ρˆ0) , (22)
d4 ρˆ1,q
du4

u=0
=
12ρˆ0
n¯2T
− 6
n¯3T
(aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†) + 1
n¯4T
(
aˆ4 ρˆ0 + 6aˆ2 ρˆ0(aˆ†)2 + ρˆ0(aˆ†)4
)
(23)
Denote by Kˆq = ρˆ1,q log ρˆ1,q − ρˆ1,q log ρˆ0 the term inside the trace in the definition of QRE
D
(
ρˆ1,q‖ ρˆ0
)
. Now, let’s evaluate each term of the Taylor series expansion of D
(
ρˆ1,q‖ ρˆ0
)
.
1) First term: Using Lemma 1, the first derivative of Kˆq with respect to u is as follows:
dKˆq
du
=
dρˆ1,q
du
log ρˆ1,q + ρˆ1,q
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−11 (s)
dρˆ1,q
du
σˆ−11 (s) −
dρˆ1,q
du
log ρˆ0, (24)
where σˆ1(s) = s ρˆ1,q + (1 − s)Iˆ. Setting u = 0 yields:
dKˆq
du

u=0
=
dρˆ1,q
du

u=0
log ρˆ0 + ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)
dρˆ1,q
du

u=0
σˆ−10 (s) −
dρˆ1,q
du

u=0
log ρˆ0 (25)
= ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)
dρˆ1,q
du

u=0
σˆ−10 (s), (26)
where σˆ0(s) = s ρˆ0 + (1 − s)Iˆ. Since dρˆ1,qdu

u=0
= 0 by (21), dKˆqdu

u=0
= 0. Thus, Tr
[
dKˆq
du

u=0
]
.
2) Second term: Using Lemma 2, the second derivative of Kˆq with respect to u is as follows:
d2Kˆq
du2
= 2
dρˆ1,q
du
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−11 (s)
dρˆ1,q
du
σˆ−11 (s) − 2ρˆ1,q
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−11 (s)
dρˆ1,q
du
σˆ−11 (s)
dρˆ1,q
du
σˆ−11 (s)
+ ρˆ1,q
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−11 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2
σˆ−11 (s) +
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2
log ρˆ1,q −
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2
log ρˆ0. (27)
Setting u = 0 in (27), discarding terms containing dρˆ1,qdu

u=0
= 0, and canceling the positive and
negative d
2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
log ρˆ0, we have:
d2Kˆq
du2

u=0
= ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s) (28)
Substitution of (22) into (28) yields the following:
d2Kˆq(u)
du2

u=0
=
2
n¯2T
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s) −
2
n¯T
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s) (29)
Now note that σˆ0(s) is diagonal in the Fock state basis, implying:
σˆ−10 (s) =
∞∑
k=0
(stk + (1 − s))−1 |k〉 〈k | , (30)
where we implicitly substitute n¯T for n¯B in (4). Now,∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s) =
∫ 1
0
ds
∞∑
k=0
tk(stk + (1 − s))−2 |k〉 〈k | = Iˆ (31)∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s) =
∫ 1
0
ds
∞∑
k=0
(k + 1)tk+1(stk + (1 − s))−2 |k〉 〈k |
=
n¯T
1 + n¯T
∞∑
k=0
(k + 1) |k〉 〈n| , (32)
since
∫ 1
0 ds(sq+ (1− s))−2 = 1q for q > 0. Here, the traces of the two terms in (29) cancel. Thus,
Tr
[
d2Kˆq
du2

u=0
]
= 0.
3) Third term: Again using Lemma 2, the third derivative of Kˆq with respect to u is:
d3Kˆq
du3
= 3
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−11 (s)
dρˆ1,q
du
σˆ−11 (s) − 6
dρˆ1,q
du
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−11 (s)
dρˆ1,q
du
σˆ−11 (s)
dρˆ1,q
du
σˆ−11 (s)
+ 3
dρˆ1,q
du
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−11 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2
σˆ−11 (s) − 3ρˆ1,q
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−11 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2
σˆ−11 (s)
dρˆ1,q
du
σˆ−11 (s)
+ 6ρˆ1,q
∫ 1
0
s2dsσˆ−11 (s)
dρˆ1,q
du
σˆ−11 (s)
dρˆ1,q
du
σˆ−11 (s)
dρˆ1,q
du
σˆ−11 (s)
− 3ρˆ1,q
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−11 (s)
dρˆ1,q
du
σˆ−11 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2
σˆ−11 (s)
+ ρˆ1,q
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−11 (s)
d3 ρˆ1,q
du3
σˆ−11 (s) +
d3 ρˆ1,q
du3
log ρˆ1,q −
d3 ρˆ1,q
du3
log ρˆ0. (33)
Since dρˆ1,qdu

u=0
= 0 and d
3 ρˆ1,q
du3

u=0
= 0 by (21), d
3Kˆq
du3

u=0
= 0.
4) Fourth term: We use Lemma 2 once again, however, for brevity we omit writing terms
containing dρˆ1,qdu and
d3 ρˆ1,q
du3 , as these are zero operators when u = 0. Therefore, we have:
d4Kˆq
du4
= 6
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−11 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2
σˆ−11 (s) − 6ρˆ1,q
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−11 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2
σˆ−11 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2
σˆ−11 (s)
+ ρˆ1,q
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−11 (s)
d4 ρˆ1,q
du4
σˆ−11 (s) +
d4 ρˆ1,q
d4u
log ρˆ1,q −
d4 ρˆ1,q
d4u
log ρˆ0. (34)
Setting u = 0 yields:
d4Kˆq(u)
du4

u=0
= 6
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
− 6ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
+ ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)
d4 ρˆ1,q
du4

u=0
σˆ−10 (s). (35)
Substitution of (22) in the first term of (35) and taking the trace yields:
Tr
[
6
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
24
n¯4T
Tr
[
aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
− 24
n¯3T
Tr
[
aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
−24
n¯3T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
+
24
n¯2T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
. (36)
The four terms in (36) are evaluated using (31) and (32):
24
n¯4T
Tr
[
aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
24(1 + 2n¯T)
n¯2T(1 + n¯T)
(37)
−24
n¯3T
Tr
[
aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
= −24
n¯2T
(38)
−24
n¯3T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
= −24
n¯2T
(39)
24
n¯2T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
24
n¯2T
. (40)
Summing (37)-(40) yields the first term of (35):
Tr
[
6
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
24(1 + 2n¯T)
n¯2T(1 + n¯T)
− 24
n¯2T
(41)
Substitution of (22) in the second term of (35) and taking the trace yields:
Tr
[
−6ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
]
= −24
n¯4T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
+
24
n¯3T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
+
24
n¯3T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
−24
n¯2T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
. (42)
Since
∫ 1
0 sds(sq + (1 − s))−3 = 12q2 for q > 0,∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s) =
∫ 1
0
sds
∞∑
k=0
(k + 1)2t2k+1 |k〉 〈k |
(stk + (1 − s))3
=
n¯2T
2(1 + n¯T)2
∞∑
k=0
(k + 1)2 |k〉 〈k | . (43)
Thus, the first term of (42) is:
−24
n¯4T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
= −12(1 + 2n¯T)
n¯2T(1 + n¯T)
. (44)
Using a similar approach, we obtain the other terms:
24
n¯3T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
12
n¯2T
(45)
24
n¯3T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
12
n¯2T
(46)
−24
n¯2T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
= −12
n¯2T
. (47)
Summing (44)-(47) yields the second term of (35):
Tr
[
−6ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,q
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
]
= −12(1 + 2n¯T)
n¯2T(1 + n¯T)
+
12
n¯2T
(48)
Substitution of (23) in the third term of (35) and taking the trace yields a sum of five terms,
however, the trace is zero for terms comprised of products of states that are diagonal in Fock basis
and have unequal number of creation and annhihilation operators (e.g., Tr[ρˆ0σˆ0(s)aˆ2 ρˆ0σˆ0(s)] =
0). The terms with a non-zero trace are as follows:
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)
d4 ρˆ1,q
du4

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
12
n¯2T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
− 24
n¯3T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
+
6
n¯4T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ2 ρˆ0(aˆ†)2σˆ−10 (s)
]
. (49)
The first two terms of (49) can be evaluated using (31) and (32):
12
n¯2T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
12
n¯2T
(50)
−24
n¯3T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
= −24
n¯2T
(51)
Since ∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ2 ρˆ0(aˆ†)2σˆ−10 (s) =
∫ 1
0
ds
∞∑
k=0
(k + 1)(n + 2)tk+2(stk + (1 − s))−2 |k〉 〈k |
=
n¯2T
(1 + n¯T)2
∞∑
k=0
(k + 1)(k + 2) |k〉 〈k | , (52)
the third term of (49) is:
6
n¯4T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ2 ρˆ0(aˆ†)2σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
12
n¯2T
. (53)
Summing (50), (51), and (53) yields the third term of (35):
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)
d4 ρˆ1,q
du4

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
]
= 0 (54)
Summing (41), (48), and (54) yields the fourth term in the Taylor series 14!
d4Kˆq
du4 =
1
2n¯T(1+n¯T) . Since
u =
√
1 − ηb and n¯T = ηn¯B, we have:
D
(
ρˆ1,q‖ ρˆηn¯B
)
=
(1 − η)2n¯2S
2ηn¯B(1 + ηn¯B) + o(n¯
2
S). (55)
Combining (55) with (16) (with ρˆW1,m set to ρˆ1,q), dropping low order terms, and solving for n¯S
yields the proof.
D. Binary phase shift keying
While BPSK is known to achieve the Holevo capacity of (non-covert) communication over
lossy thermal noise bosonic channel in the low received SNR regime [15], here we argue that it
is strictly suboptimal for achieving covertness. We use the definitions of u and n¯T as in Section
IV-C. We define ρˆ1,b = 12 (ρˆ00 + ρˆ10), where subscript “b” stands for BPSK. We evaluate the
Taylor series expansion as we did for QPSK. The first and third derivatives of ρˆ1,b with respect
to u evaluated at u = 0 are zero. The second and fourth derivatives are as follows:
d2 ρˆ1,b
du2

u=0
=
1
n¯2T
(
aˆ2 ρˆ0 + 2aˆ ρˆ0aˆ† + ρˆ0(aˆ†)2
)
− 2
n¯T
ρˆ0, (56)
d4 ρˆ1,b
du4

u=0
=
12ρˆ0
n¯2T
− 12
n¯3T
(
aˆ2 ρˆ0 + 2aˆ ρˆ0aˆ† + ρˆ0(aˆ†)2
)
+
1
n¯4T
(
aˆ4 ρˆ0 + 4aˆ3 ρˆ0aˆ† + 6aˆ2 ρˆ0(aˆ†)2 + 4aˆ ρˆ0(aˆ†)3 + ρˆ0(aˆ†)4
)
(57)
Here, Kˆb = ρˆ1,b log ρˆ1,b− ρˆ1,b log ρˆ0. The first three terms of the Taylor series expansion are zero
for the BPSK case as their form is similar to the QPSK ones. Let’s evaluate the fourth term.
Using Lemma 2, the fourth derivative of Kˆb with respect to u evaluated at u = 0 is:
d4Kˆb
du4

u=0
= 6
d2 ρˆ1,b
du2

u=0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,b
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
− 6ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,b
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,b
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
+ ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)
d4 ρˆ1,b
du4

u=0
σˆ−10 (s). (58)
When evaluating the trace of (58), we use the fact that σˆ0(s) is diagonal in Fock basis, and
that the trace is zero for terms comprised of states that are diagonal in Fock basis and unequal
numbers of creation and annihilation operators, just as we did in evaluating the trace of the third
term of (49). Thus, substitution of (56) in the first term of (58) and taking the trace yields:
Tr
[
6
d2 ρˆ1,b
du2

u=0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,b
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
6
n¯4T
Tr
[
aˆ2 ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0(aˆ†)2σˆ−10 (s)
]
+
6
n¯4T
Tr
[
ρˆ0(aˆ†)2
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ2 ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
+
24
n¯4T
Tr
[
aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
− 24
n¯3T
Tr
[
aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
−24
n¯3T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
+
24
n¯2T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
. (59)
Since
∫ 1
0 ds(sq + (1 − s))−1(sr + (1 − s))−1 =
log( qr )
q−r for q, r > 0 and q , r , we have:∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ(aˆ†)2σˆ−10 (s) =
∫ 1
0
ds
∞∑
k=0
√
k(k − 1)tk |k〉 〈k − 2|
(stk + (1 − s))(stk−2 + (1 − s))
=
2n¯2T
1 + 2n¯T
log
(
1 +
1
n¯T
) ∞∑
k=0
√
k(k − 1) |k〉 〈k − 2| . (60)
The second term is obtained similarly to (60). Thus, the first two terms of (59) are:
6
n¯4T
Tr
[
aˆ2 ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0(aˆ†)2σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
24
1 + 2n¯T
log
(
1 +
1
n¯T
)
(61)
6
n¯4T
Tr
[
ρˆ0(aˆ†)2
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ2 ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
24
1 + 2n¯T
log
(
1 +
1
n¯T
)
(62)
Comparing (59) and (36) yields (61) and (62) as the only terms unique to (59) while the rest
are shared. Thus, summing (61), (62), and the shared terms in (41) yields the first term of (58):
Tr
[
6
d2 ρˆ1,b
du2

u=0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,b
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
48
1 + 2n¯T
log
(
1 +
1
n¯T
)
+
24(1 + 2n¯T)
n¯2T(1 + n¯T)
− 24
n¯2T
.
(63)
Substitution of (56) in the second term of (58) and taking the trace yields:
Tr
[
−6ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,b
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,b
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
]
= − 6
n¯4T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ2 ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0(aˆ†)2σˆ−10 (s)
]
− 6
n¯4T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0(aˆ†)2σˆ−10 (s)aˆ2 ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
−24
n¯4T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
+
24
n¯3T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
+
24
n¯3T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
−24
n¯2T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
. (64)
Since
∫ 1
0 sds(sq + (1 − s))−2(sr + (1 − s))−1 =
r−q+u log( qr )
q(q−r)2 for q, r > 0 and q , r ,∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ2 ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0(aˆ†)2σˆ−10 (s)
=
∫ 1
0
sds
∞∑
k=0
(k + 1)(k + 2)t2k+2 |k〉 〈k |
(stk + (1 − s))2(stk+2 + (1 − s))
=
(
2n¯4T
(1 + 2n¯T)2 log
(
1 +
1
n¯T
)
− n¯
4
T
(1 + n¯T)2(1 + 2n¯T)
) ∞∑
k=0
(k + 1)(k + 2) |k〉 〈k | . (65)
The second term is evaluated similarly to (65). Thus, the first two terms of (64) are:
− 6
n¯4T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ2 ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0(aˆ†)2σˆ−10 (s)
]
= −24(1 + n¯T)
2
(1 + 2n¯T)2 log
(
1 +
1
n¯T
)
+
12
1 + 2n¯T
(66)
− 6
n¯4T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0(aˆ†)2σˆ−10 (s)aˆ2 ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
24n¯2T
(1 + 2n¯T)2 log
(
1 +
1
n¯T
)
− 12
1 + 2n¯T
.
(67)
Comparing (64) and (42) yields (66) and (67) as the only terms unique to (64) while the rest
are shared. Summing (66), (67), and the shared terms in (48) yields the second term of (58):
Tr
[
−6ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
sdsσˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,b
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
d2 ρˆ1,b
du2

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
]
= − 24
1 + 2n¯T
log
(
1 +
1
n¯T
)
− 12(1 + 2n¯T)
n¯2T(1 + n¯T)
+
12
n¯2T
. (68)
Substitution of (57) in the third term of (58) and taking the trace yields:
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)
d4 ρˆ1,b
du4

u=0
σˆ−10 (s)
]
=
12
n¯2T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)ρˆ0σˆ−10 (s)
]
− 24
n¯3T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ ρˆ0aˆ†σˆ−10 (s)
]
+
6
n¯4T
Tr
[
ρˆ0
∫ 1
0
dsσˆ−10 (s)aˆ2 ρˆ0(aˆ†)2σˆ−10 (s)
]
. (69)
Comparison of (69) and (49) shows that they are equal. Since (54) shows this term to be zero,
the third term of (58) is zero. Summing (63) and (68) yields the fourth term in the Taylor series:
1
4!
d4Kˆb(u)
du4
=
1
2n¯T(1 + n¯T) +
1
1 + 2n¯T
log
(
1 +
1
n¯T
)
(70)
The QRE for BPSK is as follows:
D
(
ρˆ1,b‖ ρˆηn¯B
)
= (1 − η)2n¯2S
[
1
2ηn¯B(1 + ηn¯B) +
1
1 + 2ηn¯B
log
(
1 +
1
ηn¯B
)]
+ o(n¯2S). (71)
This is strictly larger than D
(
ρˆ1,q‖ ρˆηn¯B
)
in (55). Therefore, to maintain Criterion 2, n¯S must be
set strictly less than the optimal value in (2).
E. Use of practical transmitters and arbitrary codes
Typical optical transmitters operate at a constant mean photon number per mode n¯S, and much
of coding theory assumes that n¯S is independent from n. However, covertness requires n¯S to decay
with n. We address this by modifying the construction of the secret random sequence described
in Section IV-A. First, Alice and Bob secretly select a subset of modes S for communication
by flipping a random coin n times with probability of heads τ. The k th mode is chosen if the
k th flip is heads. They then generate the secret random sequence as described in Section IV-A,
and use a public code on the modes in set S of expected size E[|S|] = τn. Let Alice use the
coherent state QPSK modulation. Since Willie does not have S, when she transmits, he observes
ρˆ1,τ = (1− τ)ρˆ0 + τρˆ1,q on each of n modes, with ρˆ0 and ρˆ1,q defined in Section IV-C. Note that
dn ρˆ1,τ
dun = τ
dn ρˆ1,q
dun . Replacing
dn ρˆ1,q
dun

u=0
with d
n ρˆ1,τ
dun

u=0
in (34) yields:
D
(
ρˆ1,τ‖ ρˆηn¯B
)
=
(1 − η)2τ2n¯2S
2ηn¯B(1 + ηn¯B) + o(τ
2n¯2S). (72)
We discard low order terms, fix n¯S, and solve for τ that maintains Criterion 2:
τ =
√
2ηn¯B(1 + ηn¯B)
(1 − η)n¯S
√
δQRE
n
. (73)
This method was used in a covert communication experiment described in [12]. When a Holevo-
achieving code is used (with a constant n¯S) it enables the achievability of the ultimate limit of
covert communication over the bosonic channel in expectation, as described in Section V. We
also note that it requires O(√n log n) bits of shared secret [2, App.]. We conjecture, based on the
results for classical channels [3], that at most O(√n) shared secret bits are needed for reliable
covert communication under any conditions on Alice’s channels to Bob and Willie. However,
the perspective methods to achieve this scaling (e.g., extension of [22] to arbitrary channel
conditions) are impractically complex. We offer simplicity and robustness of existing codes at
a mere log n factor increase in shared secret size, which is an acceptable trade-off in many
applications given significantly lower power consumption of flash memory vs. computers.
V. CODING FOR COVERT COMMUNICATION OVER BOSONIC CHANNEL
Constant crel determines the number of covert bits that are reliably transmissible over the
bosonic channel. Here we provide the lower and upper bounds, show how the latter can be met
in expectation, and offer a roadmap to the complete characterization of crel in the future work.
The lower bound crel is straightforward: restrict Bob to a heterodyne receiver, yielding a classical
AWGN channel that is characterized in [23, Eq. 1.3]. We then employ the known results [3], [4] to
obtain crel ≥ η((1−η)n¯B)−1. For the upper bound, observe that the Holevo capacity of the bosonic
channel is additive. Thus, the number of covert bits that can be transmitted reliably over such
channel with transmissivity η and mean thermal noise photon number n¯B is M = nB(n¯S; η, n¯B),
where B(n¯S; η, n¯B) is the number of transmissible bits using n¯S photons per mode. The Holevo
capacity of the lossy thermal noise bosonic channel upper bounds B(n¯S; η, n¯B) ≤ χ(n¯S; η, n¯B),
and has been characterized for non-covert scenarios [24]. Since n¯S is small for large n, we can
upper-bound crel ≤ crel, χ by the first Taylor series term of χ(n¯S; η, n¯B) [24, Eq. (10)] expanded
at n¯S = 0: crel, χ = η log
(
1 + ((1 − η)n¯B)−1
)
. This bound can be achieved in expectation using the
coin flip method described in Section IV-E by setting n¯S to a constant and employing a Holevo
capacity achieving code. Holevo–Schumacher–Westmoreland (HSW) theorem [11, Sec. 20.3.1]
allows the construction of such code over the subset of modes chosen by the coin flip process
since n¯S is constant. A polar code [25], [26] over QPSK constellation achieves the Holevo
capacity at low signal to noise ratio (SNR) [15]. Thus E[M] = √nδccovcrel, χ, with the expectation
taken over the binomial random variable B(τ, n), where τ is defined in (73). However, we
conjecture that the crel, χ is achievable in general. In covert communication n¯S = δccov/√n, and
this dependence of n¯S on n complicates the application of HSW theorem. Classical results [3],
[4] overcome this problem using information spectrum methods and resolvability. The quantum
predecessors of these classical methods have been used to strengthen the capacity results for
classical-quantum channels [27], [28]. Unfortunately, their use in bosonic channel setting has
been limited because of their dependence on the finite dimensionality of the Hilbert space for
the output quantum states, while the output of the lossy thermal noise bosonic channel lives in
an infinitely-dimensional Hilbert space. That being said, one could conceivably adapt the proofs
in [27], [28] to the special case of finite output state constellation, which is indeed what we
showed to be optimal under the covertness constraint.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our main objective was to establish the theoretical groundwork necessary for implementation
of quantum-secure covert communication over practical channels. Hence we focused on the
bosonic channel model, which is the underlying quantum-mechanical description of many sig-
nificant communication channels (including optical, microwave, and RF). We have characterized
the constant ccov in the expression for mean photon number per mode n¯S = δccov/√n in
the SRL for the lossy thermal noise bosonic channel by proving the converse that matched
a previous achievability result [12, Th. 2]. We proved that coherent state QPSK modulation
carries the maximum mean photon number that covertness requirement allows, and showed
that it yields optimal covert throughput over the bosonic channel in expectation, provided that
QPSK modulation achieves Holevo capacity (which it does at low SNR [15]). While we left
the full characterization of covert channel code for future work, we believe that our result
opens a clear path to use polar codes for quantum-secure covert communications, as the explicit
successive cancellation decoder structure is known for discrete constellations [25], [26]. More
importantly, we showed that we can ensure quantum-secure covertness using practical systems
that employ constant-amplitude lasers and coherent receivers. There are many avenues for future
research. Here we assume that the adversary knows when the transmission may start and end,
as well as its center frequency and bandwidth. Asynchronous covert communication lifts these
assumptions. It has been shown that the number of reliable covert bits increases substantially
in classical AWGN scenario [29], [30]. This result was later extended to discrete memoryless
channels (DMCs) [31]. Bosonic channel is a natural setting for further exploration of this topic.
While QRE is mathematically convenient, the trace distance carries more operational significance
from its direct relationship to the minimum detection error probability. Extension of [6] to
quantum systems would enable analysis of covert communication that is quantum-secure under
Criterion 1. It might also reveal a path to the evaluation of second-order constants for covert
communications over the bosonic channel. Also, the characterization of covert communication
over arbitrary quantum channels has been elusive. While the achievability was proven in [32] by
extending the techniques of [3] to finite-dimensional memoryless quantum channels (modeled
by trace-preserving completely positive maps), the known converse is restricted to product state
transmission. Recent result [33] on covert QKD opens a new perspective on this problem.
Finally, optical receiver designs for quantum-optimal state discrimination are not known beyond
binary pure state discrimination [34]. For discriminating a constellation of size m > 2, the same
physical resources that achieve optimal m = 2 state discrimination (linear optics, laser local
oscillator, photon detector, and electro-optical feedback) do not suffice [35]. For mixed states
such as displaced thermal states, the optimal receiver design is not known even for the binary
case. We expect a similar quantum resource divide in this case as in the pure state case, and
the separation in discriminability between BPSK and QPSK that we showed may lead to new
insights into this problem.
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